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, Contents I. Market Figures II. End-of-Experiment Survey A. Extended Cognitive Reflection Test

B. Theory and C. Mind, Chat-probabilistic H. No Chat-insider I. Chat-insider J. Private Value-No Chat K. Private Value-Chat-during includes plots of transaction prices per market period. The average price per market period is listed at the top of each subfigure, and transactions are denoted by red dots. Figures IA1 through IA10 correspond to the No Chat sessions. Figures IA11 to IA18 correspond to the Chat sessions, Figures IA19 to IA26 correspond to the Chat-no reputation sessions, Figures IA27 to IA34 correspond to the Chat-during sessions, and Figures IA35 to IA42 correspond to the Free-form Chat sessions. The true asset value is denoted at the bottom of each subfigure and is also indicated by a solid horizontal line. Figures IA43 to IA47 correspond to the No Chat-probabilistic sessions, while figures IA48 to IA52 correspond to the Chat-probabilistic sessions. Both the Bayesian estimate of the asset value as well as the true asset value are denoted at the bottom of each subfigure (Bayesian estimate; True asset value). The true asset value is indicated by a solid horizontal line, while the Bayesian estimate is indicated by a dashed horizontal line. Figures IA53 to IA57 correspond to the No Chat-insider sessions, while Figures IA58 to IA62 correspond to the Chat-insider sessions. The true asset value is denoted at the bottom of each subfigure and is also indicated by a solid horizontal line. Figures IA63 to IA67 correspond to the Private Value-No Chat sessions, while Figures IA68 to IA72 correspond to the Private Value-Chat-during sessions, Prosocial Index D. Honesty Index III. Mean Absolute Deviation per Sesion IV. Experiment Instructions A. No Chat B. Chat C. Chat-no reputation D. Chat-during E. Free-form Chat F. No Chat-probabilistic G

A. , Extended Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) We administered the extended (seven-question) version of the CRT in which the original three questions (Frederick, 2005) are augmented with four additional questions recently developed and validated by, 2014.

F. Taken-from, , 2005.

, A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ____ cents

, 100 widgets? ____ minutes

, Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? ____ days

T. Taken-from, , 2014.

, If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days

, Jerry received both the 15 th highest and the 15 th lowest mark in the class. How many students are in the class? ______ students

, A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90. How much has he made? _____ dollars